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ORD-0000-68

MEMORANDUM FOR: EO/ORD

SUBJECT: Statement for the President's Foreign  
Intelligence Advisory Board

1. In a number of respects, it is felt that U.S. Intelligence has been hesitant or down-right incapable of responding with adequate emphasis to <sup>many key</sup> national intelligence requirements because of a reluctance to pursue high technical and operational risk programs in response to them.

2. The following are general illustrations of the over-conservative tendency of the Intelligence Community in a number of cases which have occurred in my personal experience:

a. In fiscal year 1965, AP/ORD proposed a micro-power, microtechnology program which would provide U.S. intelligence with a two to three year lead time over Soviet Technical Intelligence Collection Systems, such as <sup>A</sup>audio, ELINT, COMINT, etc., which would depend upon this type technology for its technical and operational capability. C.I.A., at that time, decided it was too fundamental in nature for the Agency to pursue; consequently, a joint

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C.I.A. ARPA program was engendered. C.I.A. could today be sole managers of this technology, which has proven the initial contentions <sup>that it would be valuable</sup> ~~in the subsequent period~~ today for a variety of intelligence technical applications. It is considered valuable to exploit and maintain this technical lead time over the Soviets; however, neither the funds nor the manpower <sup>currently</sup> is available to do it.

b. AP/ORD has proposed <sup>the</sup> substantial technical evidence to support it. <sup>for</sup> A man-portable system ~~is~~ locating and directing return fire to enemy mortars and artillery. <sup>and has</sup> This presumably should have been <sup>a prime</sup> the national objective in Viet Nam. However, after 1 1/2 years of briefings and presentations, <sup>and</sup> ~~from~~ low caliber effort by the <sup>DD/R+E</sup> ~~D/ORD~~, such system is at least one year away from presentation.

c. A recent article in Studies in Intelligence in the summer 1968 issue of Studies in Intelligence presented three cases in which the U.S. Intelligence Committee, <sup>unity</sup> on the basis of extensive but fragmentary information, created sophisticated, expensive estimates (guesses). In each case of significant national importance, the estimate was incorrect <sup>for these kinds of</sup> because of such reasons <sup>that</sup> the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board in 1962 recommended that all-out efforts be made in audio surveillance to obtain the hard strategic intelligence necessary for such estimates <sup>these being</sup> ~~which were~~ <sup>by</sup> unobtainable in any other technical intelligence col-

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*method then available*  
lection ~~phase~~. For three years C.I.A. responded with significant funding and somewhat adequate manpower to meet this requirement. Today the effort has ~~leveled~~ *tapered* off to what is believed a less than adequate level. Although the requirement obviously continues to exist, the emphasis has been curtailed. In the meantime, progress made with micropower, microtechnology, and other areas showed promise of achieving, to ~~some~~ *a significant* degree, ~~of~~ the objectives outlined in this NSAM-170.

d. During the past one of two decades, whenever the U.S. was about to lose its assets in a country, for whatever reason, the question has been raised as to how the U.S. ~~will~~ *would* obtain the necessary intelligence *under the new conditions* ~~in the future~~. This was the case in Cuba, some of the countries of Africa, and is postulated to be the case in the ~~peace~~ *event of peace* in Viet Nam. In all such circumstances, operational and technical people met, discussed

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Modern technology and greater operational sophistication *at* some point in *history should* ~~extra~~ permit a better response to this question which arises from time to time.

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3. In general then, an improved system for applying the integrated technical operational assets of the Agency effectively, efficiently, and particularly in critical risky circumstances, is essential in the present day intelligence world.

  
C/AP/ORD/DD/S&T

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